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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
ECHO MARNE KURR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20110879-CA 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for one count of Retail Theft, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 in the Second District Court, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Noel S. Hyde, Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-102(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether defense counsel ineffectively failed to request the Long instruction or to 
provide expert testimony on false identifications when the only issue in the case involved 
the potential for mistaken identification. 
a. Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Perry, 2009 UT 
App51,J9,204P.3d880. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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b. Preservation of the Argument. Defense counsel did not raise any of these 
issues, so this matter must be reviewed under ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV, Utah Const. Art. 
I §§7,12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 23,2010, the State filed an information charging the defendant 
with Retail Theft, a Third Degree Felony. R. 1. On May 11, 2011, the case was tried to a 
jury, but the court declared a mistrial. R 62:12. The case was again tried to a jury on 
August 4,2011 resulting in a guilty verdict. R. 43,63. The judgment was entered on 
September 23,2011. R. 50. On October 3, 2011, the defendant filed a notice of appeal to 
this Court. R 53. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Testimony of Chad Wise 
Chad Wise was a loss prevention officer for Sears at the Newgate Mall in Ogden. 
R. 63:14. On November 9,2010, he was working the security cameras when he saw a 
suspicious person. R 63:16. Chad asked another loss prevention officer, Victor Garcia, 
2 
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to watch this person on the floor, while he, Chad, continued to observe the person with 
the cameras. R. 63:17. Chad preserved six clips from his surveillance which were shown 
to the jury, including clips in which the individual selected a boy's hoodie and walked 
around the store toward the exit. R. 63:19-29, 32. Chad testified that he was able to 
observe on the camera this individual leaving the store without paying for her items. R. 
63:30. 
Chad ran down the sidewalk and to the parking lot with the other officer to 
apprehend this person. R. 63:30. She was in her car with the door still open and he was 
about 15 yards from her. R. 63:31. He had a "pretty clear, unobstructed" view of the 
person. R. 63:31. Chad testified that the person in the car and the person on the 
videotape were the defendant, Echo Kurr. R. 63:32. The white car, which he believed to 
be a Nissan, drove away quickly, and his partner Victor was able to obtain a license plate 
number. R. 63:33. 
Chad contacted the Ogden police department and he gave a description of the 
person as well as a video to Detective Allred. R 63:36-37. Chad did not film events on 
the outside of the store, even though there were cameras, since he had left the 
surveillance room. R. 63:38. At no point did defense counsel question Mr. Wise about 
the accuracy of his identification. 
3 
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2. Testimony of Victor Garcia 
Victor Garcia was also a loss prevention officer at Sears. R. 63:45. He testified that 
he watched the surveillance footage twice before he came to trial. R. 63:52. Victor was in 
the surveillance room monitoring cameras, and when they spotted the suspicious person, 
Victor left to watch her on the floor, taking his two-way radio. R. 63:51-53. Although he 
was unable to make contact with this person on the floor, he received a radio 
communication that she was exiting the building. R. 63:53-55. He arrived in time to 
witness this person leave with a male. R 63:55. 
Outside, right in front of the store's doors, Victor asked her to stop, identifying 
himself as with Sears' loss prevention department. R. 63:55-56, 57. He was at least an 
arm's length away from the woman, whom he identified as Echo Kurr. R. 63:56-57. Ms. 
Kurr had a blue hoodie on her arm. R. 63:57. Ms. Kurr told him that she did not have 
unpaid items, and the man with her told her to leave. R. 63:58. Victor told them that she 
needed to come back since she did not pay for items, and the man said that a[s]he doesn't 
have anything" and the two proceeded to the parking lot. R. 63:58. 
As the two walked toward their vehicle, a white Nissan with an odd striped 
pattern, Victor informed them that he had them on camera, and that it was better for 
them to cooperate. R. 63:59-60. They got into the car and Victor asked them to at least 
4 
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return the property. R. 63:60. Ms. Kurr turned, threw the shirt at him and the two left. 
R 63:60. Victor read the license plate as they drove away. R 63:60. 
3. Testimony of Collette Allred 
Collette Allred was a police officer with the Ogden City police department. R 
63:63. The officer received the video from Sears. R 63:64. She also ran the vehicle's 
license plate, which came up as a white Nissan Altima registered to Echo Kurr. R. 63:64-
65. After reviewing the tape, the officer compared a photo of Ms. Kurr against the 
perpetrator and believed them to be the same person. R 63:66. 
Ms. Allred prepared a six photo lineup "how we always do ... where we found 
people of likeness to this person." R 63:66. She showed the lineup to Chad Wise who 
"immediately" picked Ms. Kurr as the person he saw. R. 63:66. She did not show a lineup 
to Victor Garcia. R 63:67. 
4. Defendant's Statements at Sentencing 
At sentencing, Ms. Kurr told the court that "Mr. Gravis has not been conducive 
to my well being from the get — he said just outside just a minute ago that my credibility 
was shot with him right out of the gate ...." R 64:4. Mr. Gravis said that he did not tell 
Ms. Kurr that her credibility "was shot with me. I said your credibility was shot—" R 
64:4. Ms. Kurr responded that she begged counsel to fight for her, and that she did not 
5 
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believe "that I was defended properly at all." R. 64:5. She said that Mr. Gravis told her 
that her defense "wouldn't work" and that "it was his choices to make what he was going 
to do at trial." R. 64:5. She told the court that she planned to appeal "because I feel that 
I've been unfairly — I haven't even been represented." R. 64:5. 
Neither the court, nor defense counsel specifically responded or queried Ms. Kurr 
about these allegations. The only response came from the prosecutor, who pointed out 
that Ms. Kurr failed to accept responsibility and wanted to blame her attorney. R. 64:7. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel ineffectively failed to attack the eyewitness identifications made 
in this case. He did not present the Long instruction, nor did he present expert 
testimony as to the flaws of eyewitness identifications. In fact, the record supports the 
assertion that defense counsel believed the defendant's credibility "was shot," and did 
little to actually defend her. These failures to even challenge the State's evidence 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and denied Ms. Kurr due process of law. 
ARGUMENT 
At no point did defense counsel present any evidence, let alone challenge the 
identification, or argue to the jury that the witnesses may have misidentified Ms. Kurr. 
In fact, he admitted to the jury that Ms. Kurr was present. R. 63:82. However, 
6 
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substantial evidence existed justifying arguing that Ms. Kurr was not the person who was 
present when the offense was committed and defense counsel ineffectively failed to 
challenge the identification. 
I. DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVELY FAILED TO 
CHALLENGE THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS OR 
REQUEST A LONG INSTRUCTION, 
"Mistaken eyewitness identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions 
in the United States, accounting for 88% of wrongful rape convictions and 50% of 
wrongful murder convictions between 1989 and 2003." Timothy P. O'Toole & 
Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Braithwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for 
Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 109, 
110 (2006); see John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A. Meissner, 
Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 
Court Review 12,12 (1999) ("not only is eyewitness evidence powerful, it is also more 
likely to be erroneous than any other type of evidence"). The Utah Supreme Court has 
also recognized serious flaws with eyewitness identification: 
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in 
eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems. 
People simply do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain 
variables can have on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest 
eyewitness. 
7 
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State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483,490 (Utah 1986) holding modified by State v. Clopten, 2009 
U T 84, 223 P.3d 1103. Given serious problems, coupled with the fact that jurors tend to 
overvalue eyewitness identifications, the Court opted to craft its own solution: 
[I]n cases tried from this date forward, trial courts shall give such an instruction 
whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an 
instruction is requested by the defense. Given the great weight jurors are likely to 
give eyewitness testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived flaws in it, to 
convict a defendant on such evidence without advising the jury of the factors that 
should be considered in evaluating it could well deny the defendant due process of 
law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 492. This jury instruction became known as the Long instruction. In a later case, 
the Court required trial courts to conduct "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's 
reliability along the lines laid out by Long." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,780 (Utah 
1991) holding modified by State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). This "in-
depth" Ramirez hearing required trial courts to conduct a five-part analysis of the 
eyewitness identification to determine whether the witness testimony should be 
admissible. Id. at 780-81. 
In 2009, the Supreme Court recognized that Long had actually discouraged courts 
from allowing the introduction of expert testimony in identification cases. Clop ten, 2009 
U T 84 at f f 8-14. Consequently, after an extremely thorough review of the literature, 
the Court opted to 
8 
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hold that, in cases where eyewitnesses are identifying a stranger and one or more 
established factors affecting accuracy are present, the testimony of a qualified 
expert is both reliable and helpful, as required by rule 702. Such eyewitness expert 
testimony should therefore be routinely admitted, regardless of whether the trial 
judge decides to issue a cautionary instruction. 
///.at J 49. 
Defense counsel did not present a Long instruction nor did he challenge the 
identification of the defendant through the use of expert testimony, a Ramirez hearing, 
or even cross-examination. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must show that his counsel's "performance both falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and prejudices his client." Adams v. State, 2005 U T 62, f 25, 
123 P.3d 400 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S. Ct. 2052,80 L. 
Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 
must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a 
reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would 
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. To satisfy the first part of the 
test, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance. 
State v. Ott, 2010 U T 1, f 22, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
9 
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1. Counsel's Performance was Objectively Deficient 
Two years prior to Ms. Kurr's trial, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. 
Clopten. Defense counsel never formally filed a motion for a Ramirez or Clopten hearing. 
He never moved to present expert testimony on the pitfalls of eyewitness identification. 
He never introduced the Long instruction. He failed to take these steps, despite the 
Supreme Court's opinion that cross-examination of witnesses and cautionary 
instructions "suffer from serious shortcomings when it comes to addressing the merits of 
eyewitness identifications" and that expert testimony "has been shown to be the best 
method for educating the jury about factors that can contribute to mistaken eyewitness 
identifications." Clopten, 2009 U T 84 ^ f 16-17 (including header in between the 
paragraphs). 
The literature is replete with the conclusion that juries do not understand the 
phenomenon of misidentifications and that cautionary instructions or cross-
examination are woefully inadequate to convey to the jury the fundamental flaws in 
eyewitness testimony. See Clopten, 2009 U T 84, ^ f 15-38. There can be no conceivable 
benefit to the defendant for failing to present expert testimony or to challenge the 
identifications. "[I]f the evidence ha[s] no conceivable beneficial value to [the 
defendant], the failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy." State v. Ott, 
2010 U T 1,5 38,247 P.3d 344,354, reh'gdenied (June 11,2010), cert, denied, 131 S. 
10 
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Ct. 1472,179 L. Ed. 2d 360 (U.S. 2011) (quoting State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37,42 
(Utah 1996)). As the Supreme Court articulated, anything other than expert testimony 
would not adequately convey the problems to the jury. Ms. Kurr's case hinged entirely on 
witness's identifications and there can be no conceivable trial strategy in choosing to 
totally disregard any challenge to them. 
In State v. Maestas, 1999 U T 32,984 P.2d 376, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction or to 
challenge the eyewitness identifications. Witnesses identified Maestas as a robbery 
suspect while he was surrounded by police officers. Id. at f 23. Maestas's "only defense ... 
was the unreliability of the eyewitness identifications." Id. at f 25. The Court 
summarized Long and defense counsel's obligations given that decision: 
Our decision in Long leads to the conclusion that, unless obvious tactical reasons 
exist to forego an instruction, trial counsel faced with seven eyewitnesses who, 
with varying degrees of certainty and consistency, all identify his client as the 
perpetrator, should request a cautionary eyewitness instruction. 
Id. at ^ 28. In Maestas's case, the witnesses had a limited opportunity to see the 
perpetrator, whose face was covered; for some of the witnesses, the identification was 
cross-racial; some focused on the weapon; and all of the witnesses' "identifications were 
tainted by a highly suggestive show-up." Id. at 5 29. 
11 
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Defense counsel in Maestas, like counsel in this case, did nothing to attack the 
identifications: 
Trial counsel did nothing to focus the jury's attention on the limitations of 
eyewitness identification. He did not educate the jury with respect to the factors 
set forth in Long, which affect eyewitness identification, nor did he argue how 
each of those factors could have affected particular eyewitnesses. Counsel did not 
present expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. 
In sum, the record is devoid of evidence or argument that would adequately 
inform the jury regarding the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications. 
Id. at f 30. Given these deficiencies, the Court held that "trial counsel rendered 
objectively deficient performance by failing to request a cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction that would have informed the jury of the unreliability of 
eyewitness identifications." Id. at f 31. 
Ms. Kurr has a right under due process to present evidence in support of her 
theory of the case. See State v. Stephens, 661 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) ("The right of a defendant to produce evidence in his own behalf is one of 
the most fundamental aspects of a fair trial"); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95,93 S.Ct. 351, 
353, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (same); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,19, 87 S. Ct. 
1920,1923,18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967) ("The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, 
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a 
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the 
prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the 
12 
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right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their 
testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right 
is a fundamental element of due process of law."). 
In the case at hand, however, at no point during the trial did defense counsel 
present a Long instruction or challenge the eyewitness identifications. Essentially, these 
failures deprived the defendant of the right to present her defense and violated due 
process. The accuracy of the eyewitness identifications was the only issue in the case. If 
the security officers accurately viewed Ms. Kurr commit the offense, then she could 
legitimately be convicted. However, if their identifications were in anyway inaccurate or 
tainted, then a substantial possibility exists that Ms. Kurr did not commit the offense in 
question. Defense counsel had a duty to present at a minimum the Long instruction, and 
even better, expert testimony to educate the jury about the phenomenon of false 
identifications. His failure to do so deprived the defendant, not only key material, but of 
the essence of her defense. 
2. The Deficient Performance Prejudiced the Defense 
Identification was the primary issue in the case. The State's entire case hinged on 
the testimony of two witnesses. Yet, "[t]he most troubling dilemma regarding 
eyewitnesses stems from the possibility that an inaccurate identification may be just as 
convincing to a jury as an accurate one." Clopten, 2009 U T 84 at f 17. 
13 
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Clearly, given the fact that the jury heard none of this evidence, they were left 
with a false impression that the eyewitness identifications were stronger than they 
actually were. Defense counsel's failure to call an expert, or present the Long instruction, 
prejudiced the defendant and made it significantly more likely that the jury convicted 
her of this offense. 
Expert testimony is "the best method" for educating juries about the problems in 
eyewitness cases. Clopten, 2009 U T 84 at f f 16-17; see also State v. Hales, 2007 U T 14, 
152 P.3d 321 (defendant was prejudiced by ineffective counsel's failure to secure an 
expert to analyze C T scans in a shaken baby case). Additionally, cross-examination is 
one of the least-effective methods of discrediting eyewitness testimony. Id. at J 16,21-
22. Juries, the court said, are completely unaware of the problems in eyewitness 
identification. Id. at f 15. The Supreme Court emphasized that "expert testimony has 
been shown to substantially enhance the ability of juries to recognize potential problems 
with eyewitness testimony." Id. at J 25. In fact, in stranger identification cases, trial 
courts should "routinely admit expert testimony." Id. at f 33; see also id at f 49 
("eyewitness expert testimony should therefore be routinely admitted...."). The Court 
emphasized that if the case involves one of stranger identification and "one or more" of x 
some twenty-seven factors were present, then expert testimony, as a matter of law, will 
assist the trier of fact as required by Rule 702. Id. at f 32. I 
14 
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In this case, at least one of the factors occurred.1 The identification of the theft 
occurred after a relatively short view on a security camera, rather than in person. R. 
63:16-32. The identifications were later made from a photo lineup, rather than in 
person, with only one of the witnesses. R. 63:61,66-67. The photo lineup may well have 
been tainted. The officer said only that, "we found people of likeness to this person." R, 
63:66. If all of the people in the lineup looked like the defendant, rather than from the 
witnesses' descriptions, there is a substantial likelihood that the photo lineup was 
tainted. See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1112 (Utah 1994) ("The key is whether the 
descriptions of the subjects in the photo array match the description of the suspect."); 92 
Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 379 (Originally published in 2006) ("For a fair line-up, the 
fillers should generally match the description of the suspect given by the witness.") There 
also exists the potential, though defense counsel did not develop this on the record, that 
the identifications were cross-racial. The Supreme Court expressed a very real fear that 
potentially occurs in this case: "[i]f unreliable identifications are not addressed properly at 
trial, then there exists an unacceptable risk of the innocent being punished and 
1
 The identification was cross-racial; the victim was under stress or fright; there were 
distractions; a weapon was present (weapon focus); attention given by the witness; 
length of time between the event and identification; inconsistent descriptions; the value 
of lineups compared to showups, the value of photo identifications compared to in-
person identification; potentially suggestive conduct, such as the instructions given to 
the eyewitness by police, the composition of the lineup, the way in which the lineup was 
carried out, and the behaviors of the person conducting the lineup. Id. at J 32, n. 22. 
15 
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dangerous criminals remaining at large." Id. at f 49 (emphasis added). Since at least one 
of the factors is present, the Supreme Court has held that expert testimony should have 
been admissible, which did not happen in this case. 
Additionally, as the Supreme Court articulated in Maestas, even though an 
"abundance" of evidence linked Maestas to the crime, defense counsel's failure to present 
a "cautionary instruction seriously undermined the fairness of this trial." Maestas, 1999 
U T 32 at f J 33-34. The Long instruction, the Court held, "went to the heart of the 
defense-the theory that Maestas was mistakenly identified." Id. at f 34. Consequently, 
"trial counsel's failure to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction rendered his 
performance constitutionally deficient and prejudiced Maestas." 
Similarly, the heart of Ms. Kurr's case very well could have been a mistaken 
identification, but counsel failed to present any evidence toward this potential defense. 
At sentencing, Ms. Kurr refused to accept responsibility, as noted by the prosecutor. R. 
64:7. In fact, she alleged that defense counsel told her that "what really happened" would 
not work as a defense. R. 64:5. Perhaps even more disturbing, and extremely illustrative 
of ineffective assistance, is counsel's statement to the court at sentencing that he told Ms. 
Kurr that her credibility was shot. R. 64:4. If Ms. Kurr's counsel did not believe her, then 
he failed to truly function as an advocate. "[A]n attorney who adopts and acts upon a 
belief that his client should be convicted fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as 
16 
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the Government's adversary." Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612,625 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting in part United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,666, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657,104 S. Ct. 
2039 (1984))). An "attorney who is burdened by a conflict between his client's interests 
and his own sympathies to the prosecution's position is considerably worse than an 
attorney with loyalty to other defendants, because the interests of the state and the 
defendant are necessarily in opposition." Osborn, 861 F.2d at 629. In fact, it appears from 
the record that defense counsel and the defendant were laboring under difficulties which 
might have affected her ability to have a fair defense. 
"An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney... who plays the role 
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685,104 S. Ct. at 2063. 
See also Kryger v. Turner•, 479 P.2d 477,480 (Utah 1971) ("The right of an accused to 
have counsel is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by an 
attorney who manifests no real concern about the interests of the accused."); see also 
Alires v. Turner, 449 P.2d 241,243 (Utah 1969). "The accused is entitled to the 
assistance of a competent member of the Bar, who demonstrates a willingness to identify 
himself with the interests of the defendant and who will assert such defenses as are 
available to him under the law and consistent with the ethics of the profession. Kryger, 
479 P.2d at 480. "The failure of such representation constitutes a departure from due 
process of law." Id. 
17 ' 
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Because a violation of the right to counsel is so entwined with the right to a fair 
trial, it cannot be harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 n.8,17 L. Ed. 
2d 705,87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,9 L. Ed. 2d 
799,83 S.Ct. 792 (1963)). 
Defense counsel engaged in only minimal questioning. Of the State's three 
witnesses, defense counsel questioned them for a combined total of seven pages. R. 
63:38-40,61-62,67-68. His questions barely challenged the State's witnesses as to any 
aspect of their testimony. The State, on the other hand, questioned witnesses for forty-
four pages. R. 63:14-38,45-61, 63-67. These combined failures, accompanied with 
defense counsel's statement that Ms. Kurr's credibility was shot, support a finding that 
defense counsel did not function as a true advocate, which is a firm requirement of due 
process. 
The State might argue that both witnesses confidently identified the defendant in 
court. Chad Wise testified that he had a clear, unobstructed view of Ms. Kurr from 15 
yards away. R. 63:31-32. Victor Garcia testified that he was "at arm's length" from the 
defendant. R. 63:56-57. Detective Ailred testified that after her review of the video, Ms. 
Kurr appeared to be the same person who was in the store. R. 63:66. However, as the 
Court in Clopten articulated, "juries seemed to be swayed the most by the confidence of 
an eyewitness, even though such confidence correlates only weakly with accuracy." 
18 
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Clopten, 2009 U T 84 at f 15. In fact, there was a very real danger that the jury in this 
case was over persuaded by the witnesses' confident assertions to believing that Ms. Kurr 
was the person depicted in the videotape. Expert testimony and the Long instruction are 
precisely the solutions the Utah Supreme Court has promulgated to remedy this 
problem, and counsel's failure to use them critically deprived the defendant of the most 
persuasive evidence of her innocence. 
Perhaps the most critical piece of evidence is the store surveillance footage. Of 
course the jury itself could compare the face in the surveillance footage to the defendant. 
However, the record does not reflect that it actually was the defendant's face in the 
footage. At one point, the record shows that the camera focused on the person's face. R. 
63:25, 26. But the person is never actually referred to as the defendant. She is called "an 
individual," R 63:24, and "the individual," R. 63:25,26, 27, leading one to conclude that 
her identity was not certain. Only once is the perpetrator referred to as Ms. Kurr in 
reference to the videotape and that was in the prosecutor's question, not in the answer. 
R. 63:28. 
The prosecutor took great pains to establish through the testimony of both 
witnesses that the person depicted and Ms. Kurr were one and the same. R. 63:32,56-57, 
66. He would not have had to make these arguments had the tape clearly depicted the 
defendant. In other words, the witness testimony appears to have been used to clarify or 
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elucidate information which wasn't clear from the tape, namely the identity of the 
perpetrator. 
Thus, the record does not establish that Ms. Kurr was actually the person 
depicted in the surveillance. Any argument that somehow the jury relied on the 
surveillance footage to make the identification presupposes that they did not rely on the 
solely on the security officers' representation of the defendant's identity—which appears 
to have been the key factors in the State's case. The eyewitness identifications, however, 
suffered from clear problems which may well have undercut the jury's reliance on their 
representations of what occurred in the footage. 
Counsel presented no defense contending that Ms. Kurr was not the person who 
committed the offense or that security personnel mistakenly identified her. Ms. Kurr 
had no other defense available to her. His failure in such circumstances to challenge the 
identifications or to present the Long instruction is constitutionally defective and 
entitles Ms. Kurr to a new trial with effective counsel. Because the identifications were 
the heart of the State's case against Ms. Kurr, and because counsel did nothing to 
challenge them, one cannot say with any confidence that the verdict would not have 
been affected had the identifications been adequately challenged. Ms. Kurr has met her 
burden to show prejudice in this matter. 
20 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Kurr asks this Court to find that her counsel 
ineffectively failed to challenge the eyewitness identifications in this case, and that had he 
done so, Ms. Kurr would have received a not-guilty verdict. She asks this Court to 
remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of April, 2012. 
P-^&r 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Constitutional Provisions 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defen(s)e. 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 









Case No. 101902904 FS 
Sentencing 
Electronically Recorded on 
September 13, 2011 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE NOEL S. HYDE 
Second District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: Christopher L. Shaw 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 Washington Blvd. #230 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-8377 
For the Defendant: Martin V. Gravis 
2568 Washington Blvd. #205 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801)392-8231 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on September 13, 2011) 
MR. GRAVIS: The last matter I have is No. 51, Echo 
Kurr. 
THE COURT: This is in the matter of State of Utah 
vs. Echo Marne Kurr, case No. 101902904. This is time set for 
sentencing. Is there any legal reason why we cannot proceed with 
sentencing in this case today? 
MR. GRAVIS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me hear then, Counsel, any 
input you have. I have reviewed the pre-sentence investigation 
report. I'll also hear any input from the State, 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor. You heard the trial. In 
fact, she came to trial twice. Actually, it was lucky for the 
State because they got a witness that they didn't have the first 
time that may have made quite a difference in the case that was 
available for the second time we came to trial. We'd ask the 
Court to reduce the jail time down to 120 days, otherwise follow 
the recommendation. 
THE COURT: All right. Input from the State? 
MR. SHAW: Yes. If we're going to impose jail and 
terminate, then she should be sent to prison and let the board of 
pardons deal with this matter. Clearly her record is horrendous. 
It's property crime after property crime, forgery, false info. I 
mean it's ugly from March of "96 through the present. 
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So my view is if the recommendation out of the 
Farmington Office of Adult Parole and Parole is jail and 
termination, then she ought to go to prison and let the board of 
pardons determine how best to handle her. Otherwise -- certainly 
it won't hurt her record to go out to prison, but if this Court's 
going to put her in jail in lieu of prison, then she is the type 
of individual that needs to be on probation and it should be a 
zero tolerant probation. This record is absolutely replete with 
similar offenses and recurrent behavior. That's my view. 
THE COURT: All right. Does defendant wish to make any 
statement before sentence is imposed? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, in response to that --
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. GRAVIS: -- I (inaudible) probation determined that 
they did not feel that prison was appropriate in this case, and 
that supervision, they -- because of her -- I can't remember 
where it said exactly in here, but it did -- they did indicate, 
"After reviewing the present case, Adult Probation and Parole 
staffing committee feels the present offense does not warrant a 
prison recommendation." They feel that she wouldn't be -- do 
well on probation either, and they just want -- think a jail 
sentence and termination is the most appropriate sentence. 
That's their position. 
MR. SHAW: Well, in my view then what happens is one is 
punished and has no accountability for a conviction of a felony 
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offense given her record. I mean that sends the wrong message 
not only to Ms. Kurr, but: to each and every person in similar 
shoes. This is the kind of behavior that's gone on for what, 
15 years. So she violates or she gets out and does it again 
and there's no consequences. What will hopefully keep her from 
recurring behavior is facing consequences on probation if this 
Court chooses to do that. 
THE COURT; All right. Ms. Kurr, anything you wish to 
say before the Court imposes sentence? 
(Ms. Kurr stands away from microphone and is inaudible) 
MS. KURR: I've had a lot (inaudible) consequences. I 
have (inaudible), but I (inaudible) prosecution is (inaudible) I 
don't want to go to prison. 
I feel like I haven't been -- Mr. Gravis has not been 
conducive to my well being from the get -- he said just outside 
just a minute ago that my credibility was shot with him right out 
of the gate, and I don't know why he didn't stop --
MR. GRAVIS: I didn't say — 
MS. KURR: -- defending me if --
MR. GRAVIS: -- it was shot with me. I said your 
credibility was shot --
MS. KURR: No, he said -- he did not — I said, "Please 
fight for me. Please fight for me." I want (inaudible) out of 
this whole entire time, fight for me one time. He says, "Well, 
because you -- of your credibility, you and your husband's 
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credibility was shot from the get go," because of a 
misunderstanding I had from the court exchange court date. 
Because of the court date on the court exchange said that I was 
in jail. So when I got the charges I was like -- I was in jail, 
because I was in my head. 
I don't believe that I was defended properly at all. 
Like I -- just to clarify, I didn't take it to trial twice to 
tell you that maybe I paid for it, because I didn't. I 
(inaudible) pay for it. It was nothing like that, but Mr. Gravis 
believed that what really happened wouldn't be conducive to my 
well being and that they wouldn't -- it wouldn't be -- it just 
wouldn't work. He -- exactly what he said, it wouldn't work. It 
just wouldn't go, so -- and he said it was his choices to make 
what he was going to do at trial. 
So I don't -- no matter what, if you do agree with the 
recommendations, please (inaudible) send me to prison. I have 
five kids, and they're growing up and I don't want to sit in jail 
and stagnate in jail for (inaudible) something I've done 
(inaudible). I just don't want to be stagnant in jail. 
I plan on appealing the matter because I feel that I've 
been unfairly -- I haven't even been represented. I mean right 
out of the gate this guy says -- he stood up in court -- the 
prosecuting attorney stood up in court and said, "How did you 
even know about this court date?" Like I wasn't supposed to know 
about court dates. I just don't know. 
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If you agree with them, please -- I don't want the 
recommendation. I don't want to stay in jail for nine months 
until -- while my family is growing. I would rather be somewhere 
where I could go to school or work or something instead of being 
a burden on my husband and my kids. 
THE COURT: What's your current employment situation, 
MS. KURR: Right now we are -- we haven't had a home, 
but we've been living with family for a year, and we have -- I'm 
doing -- what is it called? I'm sorry. 
MR. GRAVIS: Vocation --
MS. KURR: No. It's a transitional housing program. We 
just got a house as of last week. We're moving into it current 
right now. So they're just -- I'm doing (inaudible) programs 
through voc-rehab, through (inaudible). I don't understand all 
of it yet. Everything has been kind of really hectic right now. 
We finally got a home after a year (inaudible). 
I'd like to also ask you that no matter what the 
sentence, my kids -- my husband works full time, and I do love my 
kids. We haven't taken -- registered them from the old school to 
the new school, and I was wondering if you would give me time to 
put them in there, to register them in (inaudible) school. 
MR. GRAVIS: Yeah, we were going to ask to let her check 
into jail on Monday. 
THE COURT: All right. According to the report, the 
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time that's been served in this case is 17 days; is that correct? 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes. 
MS. KURR: It was actually 30, but -- I was arrested 
for (inaudible). 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, I want to say one more thing, if 
I may. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SHAW: As I looked at the report, the record 
reflects a total of I believe seven felonies whereas the matrix 
only accounts for four and assigns two points -- or two and 
assigns four points, rather. So I mean this matrix has been 
miscalculated to give her the benefit of the doubt. 
MS. KURR: You've got (inaudible). You have to 
(inaudible). 
MR. SHAW: All I'm trying to point out is what I'm 
hearing here is there's not an acceptance of responsibility, it's 
Mr. Gravis' fault. This case was tried in front of a jury. This 
Court watched a video tape.. This jury rendered its verdict after 
a very short period of time, and again, we have recurrent 
behavior for years and years and years and years. Ms. Kurr has 
to stop. 
THE COURT: Is there anything further, Ms. Kurr, that 
you wish to say or that anyone else wishes the Court to consider 
before sentence is imposed? 
MR. GRAVIS: Just one thing, your Honor. Although 
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Mr. Shaw counts them right, there was a series of separate 
forgeries, they're all the same conviction date. 
MR. SHAW: Yeah, but they're three --
MS. KURR: That's all of them. 
MR. SHAW: -- different agencies. There's North Ogden, 
Ogden --
MS. KURR: Because I — 
MR. SHAW: -- and Riverdale. 
MS. KURR: Because I did (inaudible) and I had my 
(inaudible) consequences for that, and I went to jail for a year 
and lost my kids and had to get them back and work my way up the 
ladder, and do everything., I did it, and I did it awesome. But 
all of -- they spread them out and they don't put them all 
together, but there is -- they was all the same time, and I 
admitted to everything I did. I took every hit on all of them, 
because I did accept my (inaudible) consequences and my 
responsibility for what I had done. I have done (inaudible) from 
that also. My whole entire family has, as a matter of fact. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further? 
MR. SHAW: No. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court is prepared to impose 
sentence in this case. For the defendant's conviction on the 
charge of retail theft, a 3rd Degree Felony, the Court is going to 
impose a sentence of incarceration in the Utah State Prison for 
zero to five years. It's an indeterminate length. I am going to 
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suspect that prison sentence, however, upon the successful 
completion of court probation. 
The court probation is going to be for a period of two 
years. The Court will require as the conditions of probation 
that there be no violations of the law, federal, state, local or 
otherwise, other than minor infractions during the period of 
incarceration. 
The Court is going to further require that the defendant 
serve a period of 200 days in the Weber County Jail. I will give 
you credit for time served, which is the 17 days. Also authorize 
adjustments for good time, and further provide that the final 45 
days of that sentence may be served through the day reporting 
program. 
Ma'am, do you have any employment at this point that's 
available to you? 
MS. KURR; Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I will authorize work release as well, then, 
subject to qualifying for the work release program as set forth 
at the jail. The probation period will continue following the 
defendant's release from custody for a period of two years from 
today's date. That will be a zero tolerance court probation, so 
that any further violations of the law will result in the 
imposition of the sentence -- the prison sentence originally 
imposed by the Court. That will be the sentence. 
MR. GRAVIS: Can she check in Monday so she can --
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THE COURT: Yes. She may check in on Monday. That is 
September 19th, 2011 at or before 5 p.m. So before 5 p.m. on 
Monday will be the check in time. Ma'am, as in all sentencing 
matters, you do have a right of appeal from the sentence. That 
right continues for a period of 30 days. 
MR. GRAVIS: She had previously filed a pro se motion 
notice of appeal. I explained to her that we need to redo that 
and we'll take care of that. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. GRAVIS: That's all the matters I have at this time, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
MR. SHAW: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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